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exotic cylinder seals into plain beads or adorn-
ments in Mycenaean style represents a different 
kind of claim about foreign exchange. Perhaps 
the Theban elite were intimidated by the Near 
Eastern states and the powerful heritage rep-
resented through the lapis lazuli cylinder seals. 
Whatever their motivation, their strategy to limit 
the spread of foreign iconography was flouted by 
those actors who acquired faience cylinder seals. 
The deployment of their own foreign objects 
by non-palatial actors could represent the com-
petitive acts of elite figures claiming their own 
relationships with external sources of power. 
The individuals who held the visual symbols of 
foreign connections displayed their own oppor-
tunities and obligations beyond the local realm, 
perhaps in open defiance of the centralized 
authority at Thebes. International reciprocity 
operating at a non-palatial level can thus be seen 
as a destabilizing impulse to a centralized power 
that aims to control long-distance exchange and 
its resources.
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Abstract
A modified version of Marshall Sahlins’s model of reciprocity, which maps the modes of reciprocity across 
kinship distance, helps elucidate reciprocity in Homer. With important qualifications, Homeric reciprocity 
can also elucidate the social realities of Archaic Greece. There are three primary modes of Homeric reciproc-
ity: general, or altruistic giving, balanced exchange, and negative taking. The model for general reciprocity 
is family relationships, and it characterizes a ruler’s relationship with the community, where it masks the 
reality that the upward flow of chiefly tribute exceeds the downward flow of the ruler’s largesse. Balanced 
reciprocity is practiced between peers within the same community: exchange items are notionally of equiva-
lent value and the transaction is completed within a limited timeframe. Exchanges outside the community 
tend to be negative: ‘stranger’ is often synonymous with ‘enemy’.
 Walter Donlan further distinguishes between balanced reciprocities that are compensatory, and tend to 
be (but are not always) negative, and positive compactual reciprocities such as guest-friendship (xenia). 
Significantly, compensatory reciprocity includes reciprocities that begin as negative, in which the victim 
is able to exact compensation (poinē) or revenge (tisis). In Homer, balanced reciprocity consists of seven 
primary ritual practices: marriage (gamos) and supplication ( hiketeia) can be related to xenia, as can 
sacrifice ( iera rezein), somewhat more distantly; ransom (apoina) is related to poinē and tisis. In addi-
tion to systematizing further and refining Sahlins’s model, this paper shows that the plots of both Homeric 
epics are comprehensively structured by reciprocity: whereas the Iliad consists of a causal chain of balanced 
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Sahlins’s Model 50 Years Later
Among Homeric scholars, the model of reciproc-
ity developed by Marshall Sahlins has proven 
influential.1 Sahlins (1972: 191, 196-204; cf. 
Schieffelin 1980: 511-12) argued that the basic 
types of reciprocity—generalized, balanced, and 
negative—change with the social distance sepa-
rating the exchange parties. Within the immedi-
ate kinship group and community, generalized 
reciprocity predominates: such reciprocities are 
called generalized because they belong to a larger 
system rather than a single exchange (Sahlins 
1972: 196; van Wees 1998: 21-24). In its ideal 
form, generalized reciprocity is selfless: one gives 
because one can, one takes because one needs, 
and although obligations are still felt one does 
so without thought of return (Sahlins 1972: 
193-94; Zanker 1998; Postlethwaite 1998; Gill 
1998). The parent–child relationship embodies 
generalized reciprocity, and there is a tendency to 
treat other hierarchical relationships as analogous 
or even identical. It covers a range of behaviors 
that fall under the heading of ‘sharing’ (Sahlins 
1972: 194, 196; Binford 2001: 24). Its broader, 
social function is to provide material support 
that creates and sustains relationships, fostering 
unity within the group while subordinating it 
to a leader (Sahlins 1972: 186, 190, following 
Gouldner 1960: 176-77). The social aspect of 
the exchange is thus more important than the 
material (Sahlins 1972: 194; Donlan 1982: 140).
In Homer, prominent examples of general-
ized reciprocity involve kinship and its social 
analogues, and the complementary relationship 
between chiefly dues and generosity—the lat-
ter including public feasts and sacrifices, and 
gifts and prizes.2 In general, the upward flow of 
goods and services to the leader will exceed the 
downward flow of largesse: for example, in war-
fare a basically equal division of spoils reinforces 
group solidarity, while supernumerary prizes of 
honor to the leader affirm rank and provide the 
resources that allow him to be generous, thereby 
indebting the group and securing its loyalty 
and service. From Iliad 12.307-21 we see that 
other forms of chiefly due in Homer include 
land allotments and banqueting privileges. The 
same passage suggests that such imbalances are 
paid for, as it were, through effective leadership 
in endeavors such as protecting the community 
and enriching it with plunder.
Generally speaking, then, a primary objective 
of amassing wealth is to convert it into social 
rank and relationships (Sahlins 1972: 210-15). 
The deferral of the return exchange and primacy 
of the relationship over the material assimilates 
the generalized reciprocity of ruler and his people 
to the family model of such exchanges. In eco-
nomic terms, however, the system reverses the 
family model: the rhetoric of generosity and due, 
and the deferral of return mask the expectation 
of a return that will materially exceed the ruler’s 
generosity, yielding an unbalanced or exploita-
tive reciprocity, as it were. The leader who is not 
sufficiently generous will, however, meet with 
resentment from his followers; and both epics 
suggest that such resentments were common-
place (e.g., Iliad 1.122, 231; Odyssey 10.38-42—
Donlan 1982: 163, 167-70; 1998: 64; Seaford 
2004: 39-47). Reciprocity would thus seem to 
map onto social hierarchy in a manner parallel to 
social distance, so that wealth distinctions con-
strain assistance in inverse proportion to kinship 
distance (Sahlins 1972: 213; Donlan 1982: 140-
41). Whereas ostensibly altruistic acts of gener-
osity may nevertheless obligate and subordinate, 
there is more potential for the next category of 
reciprocity—balanced—to be overtly agonistic 
(Mauss 1990 [1925]: 6-7, 74-75).
exchanges, generalized, though not redistributive, reciprocities predominate in the Odyssey. The causal link 
between exchanges is attenuated as a consequence.
Keywords: guest-friendship, Homer, marriage, reciprocity, revenge, sacrifice
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Outside the immediate community, but still 
among peers in the community or tribe with 
whom an affinity is felt, balanced reciprocity 
is the norm: ideally, the items exchanged are 
of equivalent value, and the exchange is either 
simultaneous or takes place within an agreed-
upon timeframe. In contrast with generalized 
reciprocity, balanced reciprocity is less personal 
and more nearly resembles economic exchange, 
so that ‘the material side of the transaction is at 
least as critical as the social’ (Sahlins 1972: 195; 
cf. Donlan 1982: 140). The exchange parties 
have distinct though possibly aligned interests. 
If the debt is immediately and fully cancelled, 
its role in creating and maintaining social 
relationships is attenuated in comparison with 
generalized reciprocity, yet it remains embedded 
in such relationships, which could be compro-
mised by an unequal exchange.
There are, however, advantages to be had by 
unequal exchanges: for example, an exchange 
without remainder could actually weaken the 
relationship, as obligations are no longer felt 
by either party (Sahlins 1972: 222-23; Donlan 
1982: 146; van Wees 1998: 25-26). Unequal 
exchanges can also be used to calibrate the rela-
tive social status of the exchange partners—for 
example, in forming a marriage alliance (Sahl-
ins 1972: 222-30; Donlan 1982: 145-47). As 
such, they establish and advertise hierarchy; and 
although such exchanges will be represented as 
magnanimous, they are inherently competitive 
and can even involve ‘gift attacks’ that aim not 
only to mark the recipient as subordinate, but 
even to deprive him of honor (timē) (Donlan 
1993: 164; cf. Mauss 1990 [1925]: 29; Wilson 
2002: 5; Lyons 2012: 13; on timē see Nagy 1999; 
van Wees 1992; Beidelman 1989). For the same 
reason, there are potential advantages in delaying 
repayment, during which time the beneficiary 
remains under obligation to the benefactor; nor 
does the benefit accrue solely to the benefactor, 
as the social bonds uniting both parties are main-
tained and potentially strengthened (Gouldner 
1960: 174-75; Morris 1986a: 2). There are thus 
two primary ways of using balanced reciprocity 
to sustain relationships: outbidding the initial 
giver’s generosity with the return gift, and allow-
ing time to elapse between gifts, as for example in 
Homeric guest-friendship. Despite the increased 
social distance between exchange partners, bal-
anced reciprocity can thus serve the same instru-
mental functions as generalized.
Donlan (1982: 143-46) distinguishes between 
two classes of balanced reciprocity: compensa-
tory and compactual. Compensatory reciprocity 
tends to be negative, involving, for example, 
debts, fines, and compensation for loss of life, 
possessions, or honor; but it can also include 
wages and rewards. Such reciprocities follow the 
logic of gift-exchange in that an initial action 
creates a subordinating ‘debt’ that the recipi-
ent seeks to ‘repay’ in an equalizing exchange. 
For example, someone may receive an insult, 
thereby losing timē, and then repay the insult by 
inflicting an equivalent loss. Under the rubric of 
compactual reciprocity, Donlan (1982: 145, 148) 
places ‘peace-making and friendship agreements, 
marital alliances, hospitality, gift-giving, and gift-
exchange’. Such reciprocities may thus concretely 
signify the choice to pursue self-interest through 
alliance rather than negative reciprocity. Whereas 
compensatory reciprocity emphasizes the mate-
rial aspect of the exchange, compactual reciproc-
ity emphasizes the social (Donlan 1982: 151).
Reciprocities with strangers are assumed to be 
negative, eristic and unsociable: non-kin is often 
a ‘synonym for “enemy” or “stranger”’ (Sahlins 
1972: 197), while a stranger can be a synonym 
for ‘thief ’ (Walcot 2009 [1977]: 141). At its 
limit, negative reciprocity involves ‘the attempt 
to get something for nothing with impunity’ 
(Sahlins 1972: 195). The social and economic 
interests of the exchange parties are thus directly 
opposed. Tactics involve ‘various degrees of cun-
ning, guile, stealth, and violence’ (Sahlins 1972: 
195). Prominent examples in Homer include: 
commercial trade, theft, piracy, cattle raids, the 
capture of persons for slavery, killing, war, and 
insults or other attacks on personal honor.
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In Homer, most moveable goods are acquired 
through gift exchange or warfare and related 
activities (Donlan 1982: 142, 151; Seaford 1994: 
18-19). Conversely, slaves are ‘virtually the only 
objects bought by Greeks’ (Finley 1954a: 173), 
while commodity exchange never occurs within 
the same community (Seaford 1994: 17-18; 
2004: 25-27). Finally, as the above example on 
insults illustrates, there is always the possibility 
that a negative reciprocity will be transformed 
into Donlan’s compensatory reciprocity.
This leads to an important distinction that 
van Wees (1998) draws between Sahlins’s neg-
ative reciprocities, noting that they include 
exchanges where ‘it is the attitude of the par-
ticipants which is negative, insofar as they are 
openly “selfish” and “mean” with positively val-
ued objects of exchange’, and those where
it is the objects of exchange, the insults and 
injuries traded, which are negatively valued. 
The exchange of harm between enemies may 
quite properly be called ‘negative reciprocity’, 
but has no place at the end of a spectrum 
ranging from altruistic to egotistic attitudes 
toward exchange. (van Wees 1998: 24)
Stated differently, in Sahlins’s model, negative 
reciprocity ranges from commercial profit to 
simple theft and other imposed losses, as well as 
to revenge over such losses; and van Wees objects 
to the linkage between pure taking and revenge 
on the grounds that the psychology of the 
agents is incompatible.
At first this might seem to confirm the wis-
dom of mapping reciprocity onto social dis-
tance, and it should be noted that taking and 
revenge are analogous as impositions of loss. 
Nevertheless, the sentiment of the exchange 
partners is central to Sahlins’s model, which 
can be reconfigured in affective terms, such that 
generalized reciprocity is pure giving motivated 
by positive sentiment and a resulting disposi-
tion to altruism, while balanced reciprocity is 
equal exchange motivated by positive sentiment 
and self-interest and a resulting disposition to 
fairness, and negative reciprocity is pure taking, 
motivated either by pure egoism, in exchanges 
resulting in loss, or by anger over suffering loss. 
In the latter case, this may lead to the attempted 
exercise of revenge or material compensation. 
The egoistic taking of the first type of negative 
reciprocity thus stands in contrast with the self-
less giving of generalized reciprocity; the second 
type is identical with the first as a form of pure 
taking, and as such likewise stands in contrast 
with the pure giving of generalized reciprocity. 
But its affective motivation, the anger felt by the 
agent towards the exchange partner, is antitheti-
cal to the positive feelings that characterize gen-
eralized reciprocity; and if successfully executed 
it combines with the first negative reciprocity to 
produce a type of Donlan’s compensatory reci-
procity. These congruencies and oppositions are 
possible because generalized reciprocity includes 
both a sentiment, symbolized by parental love, 
and a resulting action, selfless giving, which can 
be separately opposed: selfless giving by egoistic 
taking, a parent’s love by a victim’s hatred. Sen-
timent thus helps determine, and can signifi-
cantly nuance, understanding of the exchange 
behavior. Nevertheless, van Wees is right to 
treat these exchanges as distinct: altruistic giving 
and taking with impunity are opposed as posi-
tive and negative reciprocities; revenge, on the 
other hand, is a negative balanced reciprocity, 
opposed to positive balanced reciprocities such 
as gift exchange. Finally, it should be noted that 
both types of negative reciprocity, selfish tak-
ing and revenge for selfish taking, can be used 
to create, sustain, and structure relations at the 
personal and (inter)communal level.
These categories of reciprocity should be 
viewed as a heuristic device: they lack native 
vocabulary and in actual practice there is con-
siderable slippage and overlap between them 
(Donlan 1982; Appadurai 1986; Ferguson 1988: 
495). It is better to conceptualize them as a 
continuum ranging from altruistic generosity 
to unavenged murder (Sahlins 1972: 191-93): 
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to use a mathematical analogy, pure giving and 
taking constitute its infinite positive and negative 
limits, implied by, but strictly standing outside, 
the sequence of possible reciprocities (Figure 1).
In terms of this continuum, market trade can 
be located on the notional boundary between 
positive and negative balanced reciprocity, with 
profit constituting the negative aspect of the 
exchange (Sahlins 1972: 195; Donlan 1982: 
141). It is doubtless true that Homeric charac-
ters’ disdain for traders reflects an aristocratic 
disapproval of ‘activities that are not embedded 
in a social relationship, and confer no prestige, 
but are regarded as negative and unsociable’ 
(Donlan 1982: 141 n. 7; see also Sahlins 1972: 
232-33; Morris 1986a: 5-6; Beidelman 1989: 
228; Appadurai 1986: 33; Seaford 2004: 32-33, 
37-38). A more direct explanation is that a 
function of embedding such exchanges in social 
relationships is to disguise their economic func-
tion (Bourdieu 1977: 171-77; Appadurai 1986: 
11-12; Kurke 1991: 96). On the other hand, 
‘Mentes’ describes the necessary trade in which 
he is engaged, exchanging iron for bronze, as a 
perfectly honorable activity (Odyssey 1.180-84). 
He is thus engaged in the balanced reciprocity 
characteristic of intercommunal trade friend-
ships and partnerships (Sahlins 1972: 200-202).
To sum up before proceeding: in Homer, 
generalized reciprocity creates, articulates, and 
sustains the community under a leader; it inte-
grates socially and differentiates hierarchically. 
The analogy to family relationships is acknowl-
edged when characterizing Odysseus, qua ruler, 
with ‘he was gentle as a father’ (Odyssey 2.47, 
234, 5.12; see also Sahlins 1972: 205-209; 
Donlan 1982: 141, 169; 1998: 56). Whereas 
generalized reciprocity is analogous to the par-
ent–child relationship, which it may reproduce 
socially, balanced reciprocity is compared to 
sibling relationships, thus underlining both the 
familial analogy and notional equality of the 
agents (see below). All types of reciprocity inter-
pellate both exchange partners in terms of char-
acter and status: when Menelaus attempts to 
give Telemachus a chariot and team of horses as 
a guest-gift (xenion), he is, among other things, 
imposing an identity on both Telemachus and 
himself (Beidelman 1989: 227-29; van Wees 
1998: 29-30; Seaford 2004: 26).
Types of Homeric Reciprocity
The constitution of Homeric society is crucial 
to understanding Homeric reciprocity, and vice 
versa. The epics may be a mash-up of mate-
rial extending from the proto-Indo-European 
period to the sixth century bc, and from Tart-
essos to Nineveh, but the social world of the 
epics is that of Homer’s audience (Snodgrass 
1974: 121-22; Donlan 1982; 1993: 155-59, 
172; 1998: 52-54; Raaflaub 1991: 207-15; 
Seaford 1994: 6; Wilson 2002: 11-12; Anton-
accio, this issue). Indeed, their contemporary 
relevance was key to their popularity, as of tra-
ditional poetry generally (Seaford 1994: 5). This 
requires, however, two important qualifications: 
first, Homeric society is radically streamlined by 
the process of Panhellenization to produce an 
account onto which audiences throughout the 
Greek world could project their own social reali-
ties, values, and anxieties (Nagy 1999). Second, 
but equally important, it does not simply mirror 
a generalized image of contemporary Greece but 
Household Lineage Village Tribe Outside the tribe
Generalized reciprocity Balanced reciprocity Negative reciprocity
Figure 1. Reciprocities and social distance (adapted from Sahlins 1972: 199, fig. 5.1).
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is itself actively shaping the world it describes 
(Wilson 2002: 6, 11-12, 37-8; Cook 2004: 
48-51). It is thus a refraction of an abstraction; 
and any attempt to play a game of connect the 
dots, which one is entitled to do with material 
artifacts such as shield-types, will produce at 
best an incomplete account.
The poems generally distinguish between elites 
and non-elites, with little attempt to articulate 
further hierarchy. Status within elite society is 
notionally egalitarian. In place of established 
institutional structures, competition serves to 
articulate elite society in a zero-sum ranking 
system. Homer describes three principal forums 
of elite competition: political, based on the num-
ber of men a leader can mobilize; intellectual, 
including ability as a speaker and counselor; and 
athletic, including warfare and games.
Reciprocity plays a central role in elite competi-
tion for status, while being allowed to reciprocate 
with other elites establishes elite identity as such. 
Elite heads of household sought to attract other 
households into a network of mutual support; 
peers so aligned within the community are called 
‘friends’ (philoi) and ‘companions’ (hetairoi) (e.g., 
Iliad 17.150; see Konstan 1998 on reciprocity 
and friendship). Although such networks practice 
generalized reciprocity, pacts of friendship could 
be sealed with compactual reciprocity consisting 
of gift exchange (Donlan 1982: 145). Such gifts 
had intrinsic value (Finley 1954a: 180; Snodgrass 
1974: 124), but this is rarely made explicit: a 
mixing bowl may be solid silver, gilded, and the 
work of Hephaistos (Odyssey 4.613-20—on the 
biographies of objects, see Kopytoff 1986; Greth-
lein 2008; Whitley 2013), but as an object of gift 
exchange it is virtually never valued in head of 
cattle. It is also important to stress the immate-
rial aspect of Homeric reciprocity; even material 
goods attain their value from an economy that is 
largely symbolic (Mauss 1990 [1925]: 5).
Homer describes seven other types of balanced 
reciprocity that play an instrumental role in the 
elite pursuit of honor (timē): marriage (gamos), 
guest-friendship (xenia), supplication (hiketeia), 
sacrifice (e.g., iera rezein), revenge (tisis), com-
pensation (poinē), and ransom (apoina). The first 
four of these reciprocities are compactual, the 
last three compensatory. Given Greek assump-
tions that strangers are not simply not philoi but 
hostile, managing relations with them is highly 
fraught and regulated by ritual and religious 
sanctions. All four compactual reciprocities thus 
serve to convert hostile outsiders into friendly 
insiders. There is a noteworthy tendency for 
the relationships they establish to overlap and 
to approximate generalized reciprocity, with the 
further result that the exchange parties are assimi-
lated to the status of kin. This is literally the case 
with marriage alliances, but marriage should not 
be seen as the model for the others: rather it is the 
direction in which all naturally tend.
Gamos and xenia are isomorphic, in that both 
serve to incorporate someone unrelated by blood 
into the household in a dependent relationship, 
and both create obligations of mutual sup-
port between male heads of household (Seaford 
1994: 16-17; cf. van Gennep 1960: 141; Don-
lan 1982: 150).3 Whereas gamos is an actual 
kinship alliance, xenia creates ‘an association 
that resembles kinship’ (Donlan 1982: 150; cf. 
Gould 1973: 93) and as such can be inherited 
(Iliad 6.215, 231; Odyssey 1.187, 417, 17.522). 
Donlan identifies the association of xenia with 
kinship as the reason ‘father Zeus’ is the patron 
of strangers; which explanation can be extended 
to include his patronage of suppliants and beg-
gars. Whereas xenia relationships are sealed with 
gift exchange, gamos may include gifts from the 
bride’s parents and her suitors (Finley 1954a; 
Lacey 1966; Snodgrass 1974; Donlan 1982: 
145-47; 1989: 4; Morris 1986b: 105-10; Sea-
ford 1994: 16; Burkert 1996: 132-33; Patterson 
1998: 56-62; Foley 2001: 63-64).
Marriage is typically virilocal, both to man-
age succession and to ensure that the husband 
remains a readily available resource in his father’s 
household. Exceptionally powerful households, 
however, may retain both sons and daughters in 
marriage, so that the household’s manpower is 
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further augmented. Moreover, gamos is typically 
used, while xenia is only used to form interstate 
alliances (Finley 1954a: 172). As a result, both 
institutions can create loyalties that pit elite self-
interest against that of community. In Homer, 
however, proper marriage does not have this 
effect, whereas xenia both can and notoriously 
does in the case of Diomedes and Glaucus (Iliad 
6.119-236): when Diomedes acknowledges that 
he and Glaucus are ancestral guest-friends, he 
declines to fight Glaucus and even wishes him 
luck killing whichever Greeks he can run down. 
He does not, however, stop competing with Glau-
cus, boasting that his grandfather Oeneus hosted 
Glaucus’s grandfather Bellerophon more lavishly 
than the king of Lycia had, and that Bellerophon 
had voluntarily subordinated himself to Oeneus 
by offering the more costly exchange gift, as 
Glaucus himself will presently do (Donlan 1989: 
11-12). This episode has been adequately studied 
by others, but I do need to make one observation 
in light of my earlier claims about the symbolic 
economy of gift exchange and aristocratic con-
tempt of market trade. Homer’s remark that the 
gods stole Glaucus’s wits, since he exchanged 
armor worth a hundred cattle for armor worth 
nine, would seem to weigh against both claims, 
but this is the only case where Homer notes the 
actual cost of the exchange items. I suggest that 
doing so calls attention to something else going 
on in the scene: gift-exchange between friends 
here literally stands in the place of a duel between 
enemies that Glaucus was certain to lose. Assign-
ing the armor drastically unequal value signals 
that Diomedes ‘won’ an exchange that does not 
normally serve this overt purpose among philoi 
(Calder 1984; Donlan 1989; Tandy 1997: 99 n. 
78). This explanation obtains however one inter-
prets the motives of the exchange partners.
Hiketeia is isomorphic with xenia and gamos 
in cases where the suppliant obtains a dependent 
relationship that involves incorporation into 
the household (oikos); like gamos, the relation-
ship can be between members of the same or 
different communities. Gould calls attention 
to the ‘systematic parallelism’ between the roles 
of guest-friend and suppliant ‘and their func-
tion within the structure of social relationships’, 
noting that hiketeia may include gift-giving by 
either or both parties, and making the suppliant 
an actual xenos (Gould 1973: 79, 90-94; Pedrick 
1982; Goldhill 1991: 72-75; Seaford 1994: 8, 
50, 70-71; Burkert 1996: 86-88; Naiden 2006). 
Odysseus’s supplication of Arete, for example, 
results in Alcinous’s providing xenia and even 
offering gamos. Consciousness of the affinity 
between hiketeia and xenia is suggested by the 
statement that ‘Zeus is the avenger of suppliants 
and strangers, Zeus-Xenios, who accompanies 
revered strangers’ (Odyssey 9.270-71), while the 
claim that ‘a guest and suppliant is the same as 
a sibling’ (Odyssey 8.546) assimilates both to the 
status of factitious brotherhood (Gould 1973: 
93; Seaford 1994: 71). Social kinship, of course, 
defines gamos relations, though any time a non-
slave is incorporated into the household it would 
be natural to use the language of kinship to char-
acterize the relationship. Predictably, then, just as 
friends outside the community are ‘the same as a 
brother’, a friend within the community (hetai-
ros) may be ‘not at all inferior to a brother’ (Odys-
sey 8.585-86) or simultaneously ‘comrade and 
brother’ (Odyssey 21.216), or imagined as fellow 
members of a ‘tribe’ (Iliad 3.32) when providing 
shelter from the enemy.
Hiketeia may occur whenever someone wants 
something, whether on his own or another’s 
behalf, but is unable to secure it and recognizes 
that someone else could. Thus, whereas alliances 
are formed by xenia and gamos in the expectation 
of mutual support, the support sought through 
hiketeia proceeds, at least initially, in one direc-
tion only. The suppliant, however, will call atten-
tion to any past services in an effort to cast the 
reciprocity as balanced, while in cases involving 
defeated or captured persons, he promises ran-
som, or apoina. Generally speaking, if the sup-
plication is accepted then some sort of return is 
expected. In further contrast to xenia and gamos, 
the suppliant initiates the supplication with a per-
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formance of status inequality through voluntary 
self-abasement, followed by the actual request. 
If the supplication is successful, the supplicand 
restores the suppliant to dignity and grants the 
request. An offer of xenia is an extension of the 
same process, transforming the suppliant into a 
peer engaging in balanced exchange.
Sacrifice is analogous to gamos, xenia, and 
hiketeia as a balanced reciprocity, based on the 
principle of do ut des, that formalizes a depend-
ency relationship among the exchange parties 
(Mauss 1990 [1925]: 17; cf. Burkert 1996: 134-
38; Parker 1998; Bremer 1998; Seaford 2004: 
39-47; Antonaccio, this issue; Morris, this issue). 
In terms of the asymmetry between god and 
human it most closely resembles hiketeia. On the 
other hand, from the standpoint of the sacrificer 
and his community, the asymmetry is reversed: in 
offering sacrifice, the sacrificer unites and articu-
lates a community that is now in his debt, both 
for securing good relations with the gods and for 
providing a sacrificial feast (Seaford 2004: 40-41). 
As we have seen, feasting is in fact the most com-
mon form of notionally generalized reciprocity in 
Homer, although, as we have also seen, this masks 
an underlying economy of exchange in the ruler’s 
favor: with sacrifice, an analogy is established 
that relates ruler to god and thereby inverts the 
asymmetry of exchange into one that verges on 
generalized reciprocity by the ruler.
An analogy can also be drawn between the 
status of suppliant/worshipper and that of beggar 
(ptōkhos) as recipients of generalized reciprocity 
in a situation of total dependency: the suppliant’s 
voluntary self-abasement strengthens the affinity. 
As in the case of suppliants, moreover, some sort 
of return is expected from beggars, so that the 
reciprocity is de facto balanced while still allowing 
it to be portrayed as generalized, and the benefac-
tor as magnanimous (Donlan 1982: 156). Xenos, 
hiketēs, and ptōkhos thus constitute a descending 
scale of honor, but each is under the protection of 
Zeus and as such deserves similar treatment: thus 
‘all strangers and beggars are under Zeus’s pro-
tection’ (Odyssey 6.207-208, 14.57-58). Unlike 
xenoi, however, ptōkhoi are never compared to 
kin.
Negative reciprocity affects the relative status 
(timē) of both parties. If it does not meet with a 
response, the agent gains status which the victim 
loses to him. In battle, for example, the ideal is 
to kill the enemy ‘with impunity’, and thereby 
acquire enhanced timē, concretely embodied in 
armor stripped from the victim. The timē won is 
not equivalent to the material value of the armor, 
but calibrated by the relative status of the victim 
within a parallel hierarchy among the enemy. 
As such, it can be more closely correlated with 
material value in the division of spoils afterwards, 
but other factors such as political and intellec-
tual capital affect their distribution: the award 
of Chryseis to Agamemnon reflects his status as 
commander-in-chief and not his achievements 
in battles in which he did not in fact participate. 
Warfare thus allows elites within the community 
to compete with each other indirectly through 
negative reciprocity. Athletics allow analogous 
competition within the community, but this is 
not how they are portrayed in the Iliad, where 
only representative leaders of the Greek contin-
gents compete in the games for Patroclus: they 
are thus analogous to Panhellenic festivals, which 
serve to channel elite competition outside the 
local community.
The victim of negative reciprocity, or someone 
related, will calculate the risk of seeking redress, 
that is of turning negative reciprocity into the 
first element of Donlan’s compensatory reciproc-
ity. The victim may then seek to do so by exact-
ing revenge (tisis) or compensation (poinē). Tisis 
and poinē are to various degrees interchangeable, 
depending on context, and in fact etymologically 
cognate: both terms represent the return of the 
damages, such that the perpetrator or his house-
hold is required to lose something of equivalent 
value to what he took from his victim; in cases 
where the poinē consists of reprisal killing, it is 
functionally equivalent to tisis (e.g., Iliad 14.483-
84; cf. Burkert 1996: 133-34; Wilson 2002: 147-
78). More commonly, poinē consists of material 
102 Nakassis et al.
© The Fund for Mediterranean Archaeology/Equinox Publishing Ltd., 2016
goods; in such cases, its social function is to 
ensure peaceful relations between the concerned 
parties (Donlan 1982: 144). If the loss consists 
of the victim’s life, either compensatory strategy 
may be pursued; in such situations, the role of 
exacting harm for harm falls to a father, brother, 
or friend (hetairos or philos) who thereby assumes 
the role of kin (Wilson 2002: 30). In cases of 
manslaughter where poinē is not accepted, the 
killer may go into exile instead of being killed, 
as this represents the equivalent loss of life to the 
household. Poinē and tisis restore both families to 
their relative status prior to the initial loss; they 
compensate the victim for his loss, or if the loss 
consists of his own death they compensate his 
relatives. In cases of reprisal killing by friends, the 
victim’s family may receive nothing, though the 
avenging party does acquire timē, and the victim 
himself is felt to be avenged (Iliad 13.414; Odys-
sey 23.312; cf. Slatkin 2011: 178). Like gamos, 
poinē sets objects belonging to different spheres 
into exchange relation. The Iliad dramatizes the 
inadequacy of material goods to compensate for 
a human life and the social imperative to accept 
the exchange; the Odyssey’s darker vision is that 
only life will compensate for lost honor.
Apoina (ransom) is cognate with poinē and 
tisis and it serves a related if distinct function 
(Wilson 2002: 13-39). Whereas the victim has 
potential recourse to either tisis or poinē any time 
he suffers negative reciprocity, apoina is essen-
tially restricted to reciprocity between enemy 
combatants in the Iliad. In cases where someone 
is defeated in battle, he may offer apoina, usu-
ally on behalf of his father, so that the victor will 
spare his life and release him; if taken captive, 
the victim’s father may offer apoina to secure his 
release. In either case, the offer begins with hiket-
eia (Wilson 2002: 28-29). With the exception 
of Agamemnon’s offer of apoina to Achilles, only 
Trojans offer apoina in the Iliad, and only to 
Greeks, while both Trojans and Greeks exact and 
pay poinē (Wilson 2002: 71-108). Such offers 
always fail in the Iliad, though the poem creates 
a backstory in which they succeed, and Priam 
does exchange apoina with Achilles for Hector’s 
corpse. Like poinē, apoina is a payment equal 
in value to the victim’s life; in contrast to poinē, 
apoina both preserves the honor and wealth the 
victor has won by gaining mastery over the vic-
tim, and the loss the victim’s family has suffered, 
which is converted from human life to prestige 
goods.
In sum: xenia, gamos, and hiketeia are structur-
ally and functionally related ritual institutions 
regulating balanced reciprocity, as are poinē 
and apoina within the system of balanced nega-
tive reciprocity. Xenia and apoina are properly 
used to manage relations between elites from 
different communities, while gamos, hiketeia, 
and poinē manage relations within the same or 
different communities. Together with tisis they 
are routinely employed for competitive means, 
often in combination with other forms of reci-
procity. Gamos, xenia, hiketeia, and sacrifice all 
use reciprocity to create and manage alliances. 
Poinē and tisis use reciprocity to restore relative 
timē after suffering loss, while apoina uses it to 
consolidate timē so acquired while sparing the 
captive’s life. Under either scenario, a human 
life may be exchanged for goods or another life, 
although such conversions between exchange 
spheres are also portrayed as highly problematic, 
if culturally sanctioned.
Reciprocity as an Organizing Principle of the 
Epic Plot
I conclude with how reciprocity structures the 
plot of both epics. The Iliad can be understood 
as a causal chain of balanced reciprocity marked 
by a consistent failure of compensatory exchange 
to resolve conflict (Seaford 1994: 23-25): in the 
backstory, Paris acquires Helen by negative reci-
procity, violating xenia; Agamemnon leads a war 
against Troy, a negative reciprocity constituting 
tisis that creates balanced reciprocity; during the 
war, Agamemnon acquires Chryseis by negative 
reciprocity; Chryses offers apoina to recover 
his daughter, which would create a balanced 
Discussion and Debate 103
© The Fund for Mediterranean Archaeology/Equinox Publishing Ltd., 2016
reciprocity; Agamemnon, however, rejects the 
exchange, inflicting further negative reciprocity 
on Chryses, and by extension Apollo, in the 
form of dishonor; Apollo then inflicts nega-
tive reciprocity in the form of tisis that causes 
Agamemnon to lose Chryseis and the timē she 
embodies; Agamemnon holds Achilles responsi-
ble and inflicts negative reciprocity on him by 
appropriating Briseis and the timē she embodies; 
Achilles withdraws from the fighting and Zeus 
aids the Trojans, inflicting negative reciprocity 
on Agamemnon in the form of tisis that pro-
duces another balanced reciprocity; this causes 
Agamemnon to offer compensatory reciprocity 
to restore Achilles’s honor by returning Briseis; 
the offer, however, includes a ‘gift-attack’, a 
negative reciprocity designed to subordinate 
Achilles (Donlan 1993; Wilson 2002: 71-108); 
Achilles rejects the offer and continues imposing 
negative reciprocity on Agamemnon; Hector 
inflicts negative reciprocity on Patroclus, and by 
extension Achilles, by killing him; Achilles then 
inflicts tisis on Hector by killing him in return, 
thereby imposing compensatory reciprocity; 
Priam offers Achilles compensatory reciproc-
ity in the form of apoina for Hector’s corpse; 
Achilles, however transforms the apoina into 
another balanced reciprocity, xenia, by compel-
ling Priam to dine and sleep under his roof. The 
pattern implies a causal connection between 
Achilles’s rejection of Agamemnon’s offer and 
the death of Patroclus, which would otherwise 
be the only break in the causal sequence.
In contrast with the system of balanced 
exchanges in the Iliad, the preponderance of gen-
eralized—though not redistributive—reciprocity 
in the Odyssey is striking. A result is a weakening 
of the causal links between reciprocities which, 
nevertheless, still comprehensively structure the 
plot; as in the Iliad, the plot involves tisis 
over negative reciprocity that includes improper 
courtship of a ruler’s wife and theft of his prop-
erty. Athena’s support of Odysseus’s oikos is gen-
eralized reciprocity: it is ostensibly for sacrifices 
offered to Zeus over nine years ago that Athena 
appeals to her father to send Odysseus home; she 
then helps Telemachus search for his father out 
of simple loyalty to the family; the suitors abuse 
the rules of hospitality and courtship, and per-
vert the generalized reciprocity of the ruler’s feast 
into negative reciprocity (Seaford 1994: 65); 
in another example of generalized reciprocity, 
Calypso helps Odysseus leave Ogygia; Poseidon 
raises a storm that destroys Odysseus’ ship as tisis 
for blinding the Cyclops, a balanced reciprocity 
imposed by a family member; Ino-Leucothea 
rescues him out of simple pity (5.336), another 
act of generalized reciprocity; Odysseus sup-
plicates Nausikaa, who provides him with food 
and clothes, declares to her maids that she would 
not be adverse to gamos with such a man, and 
instructs him to seek further assistance from 
her mother—her actions, which are essentially 
generalized reciprocity, anticipate the xenia and 
gamos that Alcinous subsequently offers; Odys-
seus supplicates Arete, whereupon Alcinous 
offers xenia, even though he presumably has no 
intention of visiting Odysseus, and follows on 
with an offer of uxorilocal gamos, both acts bor-
dering on generalized reciprocity; the other kings 
of Scherie also offer hospitality-gifts, after which 
Alcinous provides escort home, again essentially 
generalized reciprocity masquerading as bal-
anced. Athena appears to Odysseus on the shore 
of Ithaca and offers her assistance even though 
he has not prayed to her; she continues to help 
him to the end of the poem, even though he 
nowhere promises or offers sacrifice, thus con-
tinuing her generalized reciprocity to the oikos; 
the disguised Odysseus seeks and achieves xenia 
with Penelope, a balanced reciprocity based on 
his former hospitality to ‘Odysseus’; when Odys-
seus reveals himself to the suitors, Eurymachus 
offers material compensation for their depreda-
tions—that is, he attempts to transform their 
negative reciprocity into a balanced reciprocity 
of the poinē type. Odysseus, however, insists on 
tisis, compensating his lost honor with human 
life; Penelope subsequently recognizes Odysseus, 
converting xenia to gamos; and Zeus imposes 
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forgetfulness (lēthē) on the suitors’ parents so 
that Odysseus’ reciprocity remains unanswered 
by further tisis. Of the many things that the 
epics have been said to be, arguably none is 
truer than the claim that they are meditations on 
reciprocity and its discontents, and in particular 
the necessity and ultimate inadequacy of mate-
rial compensation for loss (Slatkin 2011; Cook 
2012: lv, lviii-lix).
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Endnotes
1. Sahlins (1972: 185-275), Gouldner (1960),
MacCormack (1976), and Gregory (1982:
15-24) provide helpful context. Seminal works
on reciprocity include: Malinowski (1922: 146-
94; 1926: 9-68, cf. Appadurai 1986: 18-22),
Lévi-Strauss (1969 [1949]; cf. Damon 1980);
Simmel 1971 [1908], and Mauss (1990 [1925];
cf. Sahlins 1972: 149-83; Wagner-Hasel 2006). 
On applying Sahlins to Homer, see Donlan 
(1982; cf. Tandy 1997: 94; Thalmann 1998: 
259-64). On Homer, cf. also Beidelman (1989; 
cf. Appadurai 1986: 3-7), Slatkin (2011) and 
Seaford (2004).
2.  Sahlins (1972: 188) notes that redistribution is
a ‘system of reciprocities’ (his emphasis; cf. Don-
lan 1982: 141, 154, 160-63, 172; Seaford 2004: 
24, 37). Sahlins (1972: 211, 215-19) finds that 
food is the most widely employed medium of 
generalized reciprocity. On Homeric feasting, 
see Donlan (1982: 163-65), Thalmann (1998: 
261-62) and Seaford (2004: 39-47).
3.  The locus classicus on gamos is Lévi-Strauss
(1969 [1949]; cf. Wohl 1998; Ormand 1999; 
Lyons 2003). On xenia, see Herman (1987); for 
Homeric xenia, see Finley (1954b: 99-104) and 
Donlan (1989: 6-10).
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Abstract
This paper focuses on reciprocity in the context of Bronze Age collapse and early Iron Age ‘reboot’. The high-
est level of Mycenaean hierarchy collapsed, but neither the entire system, nor the entire ideology, vanished 
with the palaces: the basileus and a warrior elite survived and moved into places of authority. The circula-
tion of prestige goods through networks of relationships continued, connecting especially the Levant and 
Cyprus with Crete and Euboia in the early Iron Age. Such objects and the relationships they embody created 
